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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ARTHUR ROWLEY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.
GRAVEN BROTHERS & COMPANY, INC., aka GRAVEN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
Defendant and Respondent.

Case No.
12384

RESPO·NDENT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a personal injury suit by a truck driver who
was injured when a load of pipe on which he was standing rolled off the truck after he released the retaining
chains.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The court entered judgment for defendant, no cause
of action, on a special jury verdict finding both parties
guilty of negligence.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks aff irmance of the lower court judg.
ment and its costs on this appeal.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The parties will be referred to as they appeared in
the lower court. All italics are supplied unless otherwise
indicated.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant-respondent does not agree with plaintiff.
appellant's lengthy statement of facts. The 20-plus page
statement ignores the cardinal rule of appeals that the
facts must be stated in a light most favorable to the ver·
diet. The verdict in this case was that plaintiff was negligent. Because plaintiff's statement ignores this rule and
presents essentially a jury argument the statement is re·
jected.
Plaintiff is the owner-driver of a diesel truck tractor
unit (R. 160). On November 19, 1969, he drove his truck
to Flagstaff, Arizona, and there received a load of pipe
(R. 162). The pipe was loaded in two tiers. The rear
tier consisted of four rows of 12 inch pipe (28 pieces) and
the front tier of four pieces of 12 inch pipe and three
pieces of 42 inch pipe for a total of 35 pieces (R. 371).
The load was fastened down by plaintiff using his own
chains and binders.
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Before leaving Flagstaff the rear tier had to be reloaded because it "swarmed" when the plaintiff drove
over a small ditch (R. 215).
The load of pipe was transported to Salt Lake City
where plaintiff called Harry L. Young & Sons for instructions on delivery of the pipe (R. 218). The truck
was then taken to the defendant's pipe yard where unloading began. Plaintiff prepared the truck for unloading by
unhooking the chains and binders on the load. The plaintiff also unhooked pieces of pipe as they were placed on
the ground (R. 178, 220).
The rear tier was unloaded without incident as was
the topmost piece of pipe on the front tier.
Although the trailer deck was at approximately the
plaintiff's eye level (R. 223) plaintiff did not look to
see if there was blocking under the front tier of pipe
(R.222).

As concerns Mr. Rowley's opportumttes to observe
whether the load was blocked on the west side of the
truck at the time of unloading, the following cross-examination is significant:

"Q And you yourself unfastened two chokers at
the end that went around the front tier?
A

Yes, Sir.

Q And that involved your going on each side of
the truck, didn't it, to see where your chain goes
and where to unfasten it?

A

Yes, Sir.
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Q

And at that time you had an opportunity to
look and see what blocks were on the right side
(west side) of the trailer?

A

Yes, Sir.

Q

And you didn't look to see if there was a block
there before you undid these two end chains?

A

*

*

No, I didn't." (R. 221-22)

*

The defendant's pipe crew was never on the west
side of the truck as the pipe was being unloaded onto the
ground on the east side of the truck (R. 226, 488). Plaintiff then went from the rear of the truck where he was
standing and jumped upon the top of the 42 inch pipe,
released and unhooked the binder and the pipe began to
roll off the west side of the truck (R. 181). Plaintiff
jumped from the truck as the pipe began to roll and
suffered feet and leg injuries (R. 194-95). The pipe itself
never struck the plaintiff.
The bulk of the testimony at trial concerned the duty
to block a load of pipe and the customary practices of a
truck driver in delivering this type of load.
Plaintiff states at page 14 of its brief: "It was agreed
that defendant would block it and use the crane to unload
it." Plaintiff cites solely to the testimony of Mr. Rowley
in support of this statement. The evidence which supports
the verdict is to the contrary. Mr. Rowley himself admit·
ted that he did not ask Mr. Lopez to block the pipe, the
only other member of the unloading crew who could have
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done this (R. 228, 486-87). Indeed Mr. Lopez testified
that in his five years of working for Graven Brothers he
had never seen a large truck arrive to unload pipe that
was not already secured by blocking (R. 381). The jury
also could have reasonably believed such an agreement
was unlikely considering the fact that the entire load appeared to be already blocked: Even plaintiff does not
dispute the existence of blocking on the rear tier and the
front tier was blocked on the east side of the truck-the
only side of the truck on which any of defendant's employees worked. (R. 329, 391, 447, 448).
Further evidence was to the effect that a consignee
would not become involved in the blocking of a trucker's
load, that job being the customary duty of the truck driver
who was best in a position to know the characteristics of a
load he had picked up at some distant point (R. 331, 340,
"*39-40, 449).
Though the foregoing statement fairly presents the
essential facts in this case, this writer feels it is important
to point out to this court some clear misrepresentations
of fact found in appellant's brief.
On page 15 of plaintiff's brief it is stated that Mr.
Lopez told plaintiff it was safe to undo the binder. The
cit:ition.s to the record given by plaintiff do not support
such a statement. At most the citations given by plaintiff
can lead only to plaintiff's belief that "someone" said it
was okay to undo the binder. See R. 184. The jury could
have disbelieved that Lopez or anyone made such a statement in light of plaintiff's admission on cross examination
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that he did not ask Lopez to block the pipe (R. 228) and
his admission that he had no occasion to see any of
Graven's employees on the west side of the truck where
they would have had to have gone of necessity in order to
block the pipe or even observe if there was blocking
(R. 226).
Page 18 of plaintiff's brief cites to the testimony of
Mr. Lopez, Mr. Murray and Mr. Thomas concerning the
blocking on the east side of the trailer which was still
intact after the accident and these witnesses denial of hav·
ing done any blocking of the load. Plaintiff then states:
"Each of the three men gave up this position
on cross-examination.''
Plaintiff offers this court no citation to the record
in support of this strong statement. The cross examination
of Mr. Lopez on this subject appears on pages 401-02 of
the Record. Not only does this part of the Record fail to
reveal any abandonment by Mr. Lopez of his previous
testimony, it reveals that counsel himself accepted the ex·
istence of blocking on the east side of the truck:

"Q And you yourself did not remove the blocks
on the east side, you just glanced down and saw
that there were several of them there. Right?"
(R. 402)
On cross examination Mr. Lopez affirmed his pre·
vious testimony that it was never his practice to assume
the truck driver's responsibility of blocking a load:
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!

i

I have been told on other people's trucks
that it's their responsibility, it's their truck and
not to fool with it. Unless I am told to do it by
one of my superiors or something.

Q
A

Nobody told you to set blocks on this truck?

*

*

*

No. It was pretty well organized, what I had
to do there."
Neither does Mr. Thomas' cross examination reveal
any abandonment of a former position (R. 363-71).
And again with the cross examination of Mr. Murray
(R. 454-69) there is clearly no abandonment regarding
the blocking on the east side of the trailer:

'·Q There was one 8 foot 4 by 4 block on the
east side of the trailer, and you personally lossened the block yourself after the accident occurred,
and you removed it?
A After the truck was free from any pipe I personally took that block off.

Q

Did you use a crowbar?

A

I certainly did." (R. 462)

Counsel's subsequent efforts to get Mr. Murray to
give up this position were fruitless.
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POINT I
THE GIVING OF INSTRUCTION NO.
19 WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
Instruction No. 19 was given to inform the jurors
the law of this state would not allow the application of
a compartive negligence standard as in some jurisdictions.
It states:
"The law does not permit one negligent person to recover against another negligent person
where the negligence of each proximately contributed to cause the accident. This is true even though
the one is more negligent than the other. In other
words, the degree of negligence on the part of
one or the other cannot be considered by you where
both are negligent and if the negligent of each
proximately contributed in any degree to cause the
accident, then neither can recover but the law will
leave them to bear their own losses.
"Therefore, if you find from the evidence that
the plaintiff, Arthur Rowley, was negligent in any
respect claimed by defendant and that his negligence proximately contributed to causing the ac·
cident, then you should answer question No. 3
"yes" in the Special Verdict." (R. 62)
Instruction No. 19 simply points out the principle
of law that once negligence is established as a proximate
cause of the injury the relative degree of negligence be·
tween the parties is of no further legal relevance. Its
language applies equally to both parties.
Plaintiff alleges prejudicial error in Instruction 19
because of the language "and if the negligence of each
proximately contribute in any degree to cause the accident,
then neither can recover
. ," relying heavily upon
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Devine v. Cook, 3 Utah 2d 134, 279 P.2d 1073 (1955).
A careful reading of Devine shows that it does not lend
support to plaintiff's contention.
In Devine the court pointed out that instructions
must be drafted with caution so as to not eliminate the
issue of proximate cause with respect to contributory negligence. The court explained that a slight degree of negligence is not legally contributory negligence unless that
amount of negligence also is a proximate cause as opposed
to remote cause of the accident or injury. The court further observed that expressions such as "however slight"
and "in any degree" are ill-advised where used in an

argumentative manner. The court wisely did not hold
that such language was error in all cases. Defendant submits that a fair reading of this instruction does not lead
one to conclude it is argumentative.
Neither can it be concluded that this instruction led
the jury to ignore the issue of proximate cause.
Just as the jurors were told in Instruction No. 2 (R.
45) "you are not to single out any certain sentence, or any
individual point or instruction, and ignore others . . . ,"
so is the rule on appeal:
"The instruction should be considered in its
entirety, and along with all of the other instructions given, to determine whether they accomplished what is essential: explaining to the jury in a
manner understandable to them the issues of fact
and the law applicable thereto with reasonable
accuracy, and with fairness to both sides." Badger
v. Clayson, 18 Utah 2d 329, 422 P.2d 665, 666
(1967).
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The jury was well and properly instructed on proximate cause. Instruction No. 10 (R. 53) specifically dealt
with the matter:
"The proximate cause of an injury is that
cause which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient interYening cause, produces an injury and without which the result would
not have occurred. It is the efficient cause-the
one that necessarily sets in operation the factors
that accomplish the injury.
"The law does not necessarily recognize only
one proximate cause of an injury, consisting of
only one factor, one act or the conduct of only one
person. To the contrary, the acts and omissions
of two or more persons may work concurrently as
the efficient cause of an injury and in such a case,
each of the participating acts or omissions is regarded in law as the proximate cause and both
may be held responsible."
This instruction correctly states the law. It does not
conflict with Instruction No. 19. Even the allegedly un·
clear portions of Instruction No. 19 would not have re·
mained unclear to the jury once the principles of this
instruction were applied.
Plainitff does not allege any error m Instruction
No.10.
Instruction No. 15 also reminded the jury that they
were bound to find any negligence by plaintiff to have
been the proximate cause of his injury before it could bar
plaintiff's claim:
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"The burden of proof is upon the defendant
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the plaintiff was contributorily negligent, and that
such contributory negligence was a proximate
cause of plaintiff's injury.
"Unless such negligence if any, or contributory negligence, if any are proved by a preponderance of the evidence to have proximately caused
injury, you may not assume it did so." (R. 58)
Instruction No. 18 (R. 61) again emphasized to the
jurors that contributory negligence must concur with the
negligence of another "to bring abottt the injury or loss."
The Devine opinion was written by District Judge
Norseth. He relied heavily upon Johnson v. Lewis, 121
Utah 218, 240 P.2d 498 (1952) in discussing the "in any
degree" argument.
It is important to recognize that the instruction in

Johnson having the "however slight" language was an
instruction on contributory negligence. The court specifically held that the instruction was not erroneous. 240
P.2d at 500.
Indeed it was pointed out that the single greatest
objection to the instruction was that, because it came up
in a contributory negligence context, it possibly gave an
unequal emphasis upon plaintiff's negligence. Id.
The emphasis was heightened in Johnson by the fact
that the duty of the defendant as a common carrier to
exercise utmost care for the protection of its passengers
was not clearly set forth in the instructions.
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In terms of balance between the parties, the jury
received a great deal more instruction on defendant's
negligence than plaintiff's. For instance see Instructions

16 and 17 (R. 59, 60) - both submitted by plaintiff (R,
77, 78). The former is the longest single instruction
given on negligence.
Viewing the instructions as a whole therefore, it is
clearly seen in this case that the jury was properly instructed that any negligence to be a bar to plaintiff's
claim must be a proximate cause of the resulting injury,
The jury must be assumed to have followed the instructions. Williams v. Ogden Union Railway and Depot
Co., 119 Utah 529, 230 P.2d 315, 322 (1951).
Plaintiff further argues in Point I that any negligent
acts of the plaintiff "were mere antecedent conditions or
attendant circumstances to the injury." (Page 30, plaintiff's brief). Counsel then states that "If the plaintiff was
negligent before he arived in Salt Lake it was because the
pipe was not safe to unlozd," and then makes the unsupported statement: "Defendant superceded that possibility
by blocking the pipe." Once again counsel makes a jury
argument to this court as if to deny the jury the right
they had to believe the many witnesses who testified that
they placed no blocking under the pipe believing that
task to be the proper responsibility of the truck driver,
See the testimony of Mr. Murray at R. 449, Mr. Thomas
at R. 362, Mr. Lopez at R. 400-01.
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At page 32 of plaintiff's brief it is contended that
the language from Instruction 19 "Negligent in any respect claimed by defendant" presented to the jury an issue
of antecedent negligence thus allowing the jury to improperly decide the case. This writer is unable to determine from plaintiff's brief what negligence claimed by
defendant permitted the jury to enter into this area. Conspicuous by their absence are record references supporting
plaintiff's argument. Even if defense counsel had made
statements to the jury regarding plaintiff's negligence,
Instruction No. 6 put such statements in proper perspective:
"You should not consider as evidence any
statement counsel made during the trial, unless
such statement was made as an admission or stipulation conceding the existence of a fact or facts."
(R.

49).

It is significant that the trial court discussed Instruction No. 19 in chambers and added the "claimed by defendant" language in response to counsel's objections.
Judge Anderson at that time well knew on what bases
defendant claimed the plaintiff was contributorily negligent and must be granted the customary discretionary
considerations and latitude in refusing an instruction on
the same subject offered by plaintiff.
To the extent that plaintiff suggests defendant claimed plaintiff could be contributorily negligent by failing
to block the load in Arizona, such allegations miss the
point of the testimony in this regard. The testimony concerning whether plaintiff blocked the front tier of pipe
and then left the blocking in place during the trip to Salt
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Lake City went to show the reasonableness of the parties'
belief concerning the existence of blocking at the time of
unloading. It cannot be said viewing the record as a
whole that the defense of this case centered on acts of
contributory negligence other than acts or omissions on
the 21st day of November 1969, the date of plaintiff's
lfiJury.
In addition, the "antecedent negligence" objection
now raised by plaintiff with regard to Instruction No. 19
was not raised when counsel made his objections to this
instruction before the court below (R. 504-05). To quote
from plaintiff's own brief at page 36:
"The purpose of taking exceptions is so that
the court can correct itself."
Having failed to do this, plaintiff's argument in this
regard fails for counsel's failure to comply with Rule 51,

U.R.C.P.
There are several erroneous fact statements in plaintiff's Point I.
In Point I it is first stated that the facts will be
viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict.
Counsel then commences to pick and choose statements
out of context and completely ignores contrary testimony.

On page 24 it is stated that the evidence was uncontradicted, that the binder could not have been released
without blocking having been in place. Counsel cites to
the record pages 474 and 475. At R.476, however, Mr.
Murray, the crane operator, stated with respect to whether
only blocking would prevent the pipe from rolling:

14

q}._
Not necessarily. It could have been a little
bit of dirt or anything under that there that would
have held a pipe for a minute. I have seen it done
a lots of times.

Q

Twemy-four inch pipe?

A You bet. I don't know why it set there or why
it started rolling when it did. All I know is the
facts are the facts, and the man undid the binder
and pipe rolled on him. And however you want
to - doesn't change the fact that the man undid
the binder and made it roll off on him."

POINT II
INSTRUCTION NO. 20 SET FORTH A
PROPER ST AND ARD OF CARE AS TO
PLAINTIFF.
Plaintiff argues that Instruction No. 20 placed upon
him an "erroneously high standard of care." The instruction states (R. 63):
"Arthur Rowley was under a duty at all times
to exercise such reasonable care for his own safety
as an ordinary prudent person would have done
under the circumstances - to discover any observable hazards in unloading the pipe from the trailer
and to take such precautions as a reasonably prudent person would take under the same or simlar
circumstances against injury. The amount of caution required for that duty varies in direct proportion to the dangers known or reasonably to be
apprehended or anticipated in connection with the
work. The failure of Arthur Rowley to use reasonable care .for his own safety would constitute
contributory negligence.
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Counsel specifically objects to the clauses italicized
above.
Instruction 22 repeats the exact standards to which
plaintiff objects in Instruction No. 20:
"However, one is not justified in ignoring
obvious danger although it is created by another's
misconduct, nor is he ever excused from exercising
ordinary care." (R. 65 ).
Instruction No. 20 correctly states the law of negli·
gence and the duty of plaintiff to exercise due care:
"The amount of care to avoid negligence always varies with the risk of harm which is known
or under the circumstances ought to be known to
exist." Brigham v. Moon Lake Electric Assoc., 24
Utah 2d 292, 470 P.2d 393, 395 (1970).
The first clause objected to regarding plaintiff's duty
"to discover any observable hazards in unloading the pipe
from the trailer" cannot be deemed objectionable in light
of plaintiff's own assertions in his brief. For instance, on
page 38 of plaintiff's brief, with respect to Instruction
22, plaintiff states: "It is a perfectly good instruction .... "
Instruction No. 22 speaks of plaintiff's duty to exercise due care and states that he has a right to assume others
will perform their duties "unless. in the exercise of reasonable care he observes or should observe something to
warn him to the contrary."
This language is not only synonymous with that objected to in Instruction 20 it places an even higher stan·
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dard upon the plaintiff: Instruction 20 relates plaintiff's
duty to observable hazards while Instruction 22 speaks
additionally in terms of "should observe" hazards.
The last paragraph of Instruction 20 is objected to
because it fails to make any reference to causation. The
error in plaintiff's argument here is an assumption that
the jury does not deal with the instructions as a whole.
Clearly the jury's task would be rendered much more
tedious if causation language were added to every instruction. In this case the jury was told numerous times (as
explained in Point I) that the negligence of either party
must also be a factor in the proximate causation leading
to the injury for it to have any legal effect. It defies common sense to assume that the jurors would leap upon a
portion of a single instruction to the exclusion of numerous others so as to do injustice to the parties before the
court.
"It is neither fair nor realistic to excerpt a
single phrase from an instruction, nor one instruction from the rest, and assume that the jury regarded it in isolation. They were properly instructed that they should not do so, but that they
should consider all the instructions together."
Simpson v. General Motors Corp., 24 Utah 2d 301,
470 P.2d 399, 402 (1970)
Counsel asserts that this instruction deprived the jury
of the right to decide whether plaintiff was negligent,
after arriving in defendant's yard, because he did not
visually check defendant's blocking before he unchained
the pipe." (Appellant's brief at page 36). This writer
finds it difficult to understand why this objection is only
17

rn Instruction No. 20 when Instruction No. 22 which
counsel states is a "perfectly good instruction" also presents this very same issue to the jury.
Plaintiff further asserts error in Instruction 20 on
the basis that it denies plaintiff the right to rely on the
duty defendant's employees owed him to block the pipe
before unloading. This argument ignores the conflicting
evidence relative to whether defendant had such a duty.
Even assuming there was such a duty, however, this
instruction does not deny plaintiff the right to rely upon
others' duties to him. Indeed the first sentence of Instruction No. 22 asserts such to be plaintiff's right. It does,
however, require that he not perform his tasks with closed
eyes as does Instruction No. 22 - the "perfectly good
instruction." It would be poor public policy to allow
someone to recover from another for a breach of duty
when the very injury was brought about by the plaintiff's
failure to reasonably act in accordance with that which
was immediately before his eyes. And it must be remembered that the most favorable evidence was that the lack
of blocking was known only to plaintiff.
Plaintiff further suggests that the instruction should
have been in the alternative so as to state that plaintiff
need discover only observable hazards or to take reasonable precautions. Such an approach in this instruction
would have been unwise as it would have led the jury to
believe that simply acting upon what was observable fulfilled plaintiff's duty of reasonable care even in circumstances when all reasonable minds would indicate that
something further should have been done.
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Counsel states that "through inadvertance the instruction was overlooked during the formal exceptions."
Asserting that, because "strenuous" objection to this instruction was made in chambers, the purpose of requiring formal objections was met.
There is, of course, nothing in the record at any
point which indicates plaintiff objected to Instruction No.
20.
Counsel for defendant is unable to recall plaintiff's
counsel having made any objections to Instruction No.
20 in chambers. Possibly the memory of both attorneys
leaves something to be desired in this respect. Assuming
such to have been the case, however, the purpose of putting the court on notice of objections made in chambers
was not fulfilled if the objections were not the same objeuions now made before this court.
While one purpose of requiring objections to be made
on the record is to allow the trial court to correct error, an
2dditional purpose is to protect the integrity of lower
court decisions against faulty memory that an instruction
was objected to and to assure that the objection on appeal
is the same one with respect to an instruction as was made
before the trial coun.
In the preparation of every case an attorney must
make decisions regarding how he will present his client's
views to the jury. This may include an intentional decision to forego certain legal theories.
Rule 51, U.R.C.P., is intended also to protect against
the revival on appeal of a previously discarded theory.
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It is not enough that Instruction No. 20 was objected
to in chambers for counsel could clearly have waived his

objections when the proper time for making objections
on the record.
When the court heard formal objections to the instruction no mention was made of Instruction 20 although
counsel did object to Instructions 19 and 23 (R. 504-05).

If the pressure or activity of the trial was such as to
cause counsel for plaintiff to forget formal objections to
this instruction despite the fact that "counsel for plaintiff
strenuously objected to this instruction" (appellant's brief
at page 35 ), the strenuous objections became mild to the
point of disappearance when the court called for formal
objections. While the pressure of the moment may have
contributed to this alleged oversight it does not explain
why this instruction about which counsel allegedly felt
so strongly was not objected to in plaintiff's formal and
lengthy Motion For a New Trial filed with the court
several days after the jury verdict when he would have
had further time to contemplate, collect his notes, and
reassert any prior positions taken. (See R. 112 through
119).
Plaintiff's explanation of why no record objection to
Instruction No. 20 is found amounts to "I forgot." No
explanation is offered this court why objections to
other instructions - not even mentioned in plaintiff's
brief - were remembered at the proper times.
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While plaintiff's explanation may be completely accurate it falls far short of being "unusual and compelling
circumstances":
"Our rules say, and repeatedly we have said
that such exception must be asserted and made a
matter of record at the trial level, failing which it
is not reviewable on appeal except where unusual
and compelling circumstances exist calling for correction by the exercise of sound discretion. Such
circumstances are not apparent here. Morgan v.
Pistone, 25 Utah 2d 63, 475 P.2d 839 (1970).

CONCLUSION
The jury found plaintiff to be contributorily negligent. There is substantial evidence in support of this
finding.
Mr. Rowley was the person who best knew how his
load of pipe was secured. The great weight of the evidence was that he had many opportunities to observe the
blocking of his load and to determine before releasing
his binder whether the maneuver could be safely performed. The evidence is clear that he failed to see what was
hfore his very eyes many times and thus brought about
his own injuries.
The arguments raised by plaintiff on this appeal do
not withstand the challenge of the record as a whole.
Plaintiff continually relates facts to this court which are
either unsupported by the record or contrary to the many
facts supporting the jury's verdict. Other arguments are
21

self-contradictory or in conflict with collateral arguments.
Point II is an argument which plaintiff never made before
the trial court or which was abandoned before bringing
this appeal.
The record, viewed as a whole, shows a trial which
was fair to both parties. As in most cases there was conflicting evidence but of such situations are jury verdicts
born. The jury in this case found no cause of action.
That verdict should be affirmed and defendant
awarded its costs of appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
Raymond M. Berry
WORSLEY, SNOW &
CHRISTENSEN
7th Floor Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Respondent
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MAILING NOTICE
I hereby certify I mailed two copies of the foregoing
brief, postage prepaid, to King, Craft & Bullen, 409 Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this -------- day
of May, 1971.

23

